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There are striking similarities in health system and other contexts between
Tanzania and Ghana that are relevant to the scaling up of continuous delivery of
insecticide treated nets (ITNs) for malaria prevention. However, specific
contextual factors of relevance to ITN delivery have led implementation down
very different pathways in the two countries. Both countries have made major
efforts and investments to address this intervention through integrating
consumer discount vouchers into the health system. Discount vouchers require
arrangements among the public, private and non-governmental sectors and
constitute a complex intervention in both health systems and business systems.
In Tanzania, vouchers have moved beyond the planning agenda, had policies
and programmes formulated, been sustained in implementation at national scale
for many years and have become as of 2012 the main and only publicly
supported continuous delivery system for ITNs. In Ghana national-scale
implementation of vouchers never progressed beyond consideration on the
agenda and piloting towards formulation of policy; and the approach was
replaced by mass distribution campaigns with less dependency on or integration
with the health system. By 2011, Ghana entered a phase with no publicly
supported continuous delivery system for ITNs.
To understand the different outcomes, we compared the voucher programme
timelines, phases, processes and contexts in both countries in reference to the
main health system building blocks (governance, human resources, financing,
informatics, technologies and service delivery). Contextual factors which
provided an enabling environment for the voucher scheme in Tanzania did
not do so in Ghana. The voucher scheme was never seen as an appropriate
national strategy, other delivery systems were not complementary and the
private sector was under-developed. The extensive time devoted to engagement
and consensus building among all stakeholders in Tanzania was an important
and clearly enabling difference, as was public sector support of the private
sector. This contributed to the alignment of partner action behind a single
co-ordinated strategy at service delivery level which in turn gave confidence to
the business sector and avoided the ‘interference’ of competing delivery systems
that occurred in Ghana. Principles of systems thinking for intervention design
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correctly emphasize the importance of enabling contexts and stakeholder
management.
Keywords Integration, context, public–private partnership, health systems, ownership,
governance, systems thinking, stakeholder management, malaria, prevention,
targeted subsidies, discount vouchers, Ghana, Tanzania
KEY MESSAGES
 Contextual requirements for the success of an intervention should be considered before an intervention is picked from
one context and piloted in another.
 Investment in long-term, managed stakeholder engagement throughout the design and implementation stages of new
complex health interventions appears to be critical for ownership and sustained integration of the intervention in the
system.
 Alignment of partners and efforts behind a single delivery strategy for an intervention results in less complexity and
unpredictability in how the system will react and perform.
 The governance (stakeholder management) step of systems thinking deserves greater attention in intervention design.
Introduction
There have been extraordinary reductions in under-five mor-
tality in many sub-Saharan countries since 2005 (WHO 2011).
Much progress is attributed to improved anti-malarial drug
policies for effective treatment, and to the scaled-up provision
and use of insecticide treated nets (ITNs) and more recently
long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) for malaria prevention.
ITNs are among the most cost-effective child survival interven-
tions in malarious areas (Lengeler 2004) and save six lives for
every 1000 nets in use. In 2005 only 3% of households in
sub-Saharan Africa possessed at least one ITN. In the past 5
years that figure has risen to about 50% (WHO 2011). This
rapid increase in coverage has been achieved through a variety
of ITN delivery channels.
In comparison with other public health interventions, ITNs
can be delivered through a diverse range of systems due to their
being both a health intervention and a household commodity.
As a result, there has been uncertainty about the most effective
systems through which to deliver ITNs to both achieve and then
sustain high coverage. Debates have broadly centred upon the
level of subsidy and the resulting cost to the end user (Curtis
et al. 2003; Lines et al. 2003), the role of the private sector and
public–private partnerships (Lengeler et al. 2007), the socio-
economic disparities in coverage resulting from different deliv-
ery strategies (Grabowsky et al. 2005b; Webster et al. 2005; Noor
et al. 2007; Hanson et al. 2009) and the relative merits of
periodic vertical delivery campaigns compared with continuous
delivery through routine health services (Khatib et al. 2008;
Hightower et al. 2010; Roll Back Malaria 2011). Campaign
delivery has also included integration of ITNs into measles
immunization campaigns (Grabowsky et al. 2005b; Grabowsky
et al. 2007), polio immunization campaigns (Thwing et al. 2008)
and integrated child health campaigns providing ITNs, measles
vaccination, vitamin A and mebendazole (Skarbinski et al. 2007;
Thwing et al. 2008; Thwing et al. 2011). Continuous routine
delivery has mainly been through mother and child health
clinics such as antenatal care (ANC) and the expanded
programme on immunization (EPI).
In Africa, much of the focus of investments and implemen-
tation of ITN programmes since 2005 has been for campaign
delivery with comparatively little attention for routine systems
of ITN delivery. It is accepted, however, that ‘one strategy will
not fit all’ for delivery of ITNs, that the key to success is
diversity in delivery (Lengeler and de Savigny 2007) and that
both campaign and routine systems are needed to achieve and
then sustain high coverage (Roll Back Malaria Partnership
2005; Roll Back Malaria 2002; Roll Back Malaria 2006; Roll
Back Malaria 2011). Whilst acknowledging the successes of
campaign systems in the rapid scale up of coverage with ITNs,
there has been a recent push for the use of a more balanced
share of resources for continuous delivery systems for ITNs, to
match those that have been made available for campaigns (Roll
Back Malaria 2011). This has led to renewed interest in
understanding the requirements for a successful and sustain-
able continuous delivery system (Webster et al. 2010a).
Two countries, Tanzania and Ghana, have approached con-
tinuous ITN delivery by implementing a voucher to target a
high value subsidy to high-risk populations to enable them to
access the private sector delivery and supply of approved ITNs.
Despite many similarities in both the health systems, develop-
ment partners, available funding and the programmatic
approaches of these two countries, in Tanzania vouchers have
been sustained nationwide as the primary delivery policy over a
period of 7 years, while in Ghana, vouchers were never seen as
a national-scale strategy and implementation in any region has
now ceased. In this case study, our question was to explore why
the same intervention innovation worked in one country and
not another despite so many apparent health system similarities
and opportunities. As the voucher intervention affects two
complex systems simultaneously, the health system and the
business system, we explore and document the complex
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histories and contexts of the ITN voucher schemes in Tanzania
and Ghana with particular emphasis on context, history, local
ownership and stakeholder management in both the health and
business systems. From this description of events, an attempt is
made to understand the enabling and disabling elements of
sustained integration of continuous delivery of ITNs by using a
systems perspective to compare the two histories.
Methods
This study included a narrative review adopted in order to allow
the inclusion of a broad range of information sources. The aim
was to document not only the development and implementa-
tion of the ITN voucher schemes in the two countries, but also
the health systems and business context within which they
were situated and the perceptions of those involved. This
method allows the synthesis of documented information, both
peer reviewed and grey literature, with that from empirical
interviews and meetings with stakeholders. This approach,
which is interpretative and qualitative in nature, was more
appropriate for the aim of this case study and the sources of
information than, for example, the narrow focus of a systematic
review (Collins and Fauser 2005). Other methods of exploration
and synthesis of information such as stakeholder analysis and
analysis of ‘street-level’ implementers, although having their
own strengths, would not have allowed the exploration of such
a wide range of information and provided interpretation of the
holistic context of the voucher scheme. The information sources
included a wide variety of documents spanning several years of
delivery of ITNs through a range of strategies from Ghana and
Tanzania; in-depth interviews with key stakeholders; and key
informant workshops discussing timeline reconstruction in both
countries.
Over 39 and 52 in-depth interviews were undertaken with
stakeholders from the public and private sectors in Ghana and
Tanzania, respectively. Purposive sampling was used to select a
range of stakeholders in the public and private sectors for the
in-depth interviews (Miles 1994). These interviewees were
selected to ensure that perspectives of individuals with varied
roles in the delivery of mosquito nets in the public and private
sectors were addressed. Within the public sector the stake-
holders included members of the National Malaria Control
Programme (NMCP), members of regional and district health
management teams, and health facility staff. Within the private
sector interviewed stakeholders included the voucher scheme
management agents, importers and distributors of mosquito
nets, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, pharmacists and
members of staff of the non-governmental organization (NGO)
co-ordinators of the voucher schemes. Interviews focused
mainly on the period of conceptualization, design and imple-
mentation of the voucher schemes, and the health systems and
business contexts during this time. Interviews in Ghana were
conducted during February, May and August 2006, and in
Tanzania in June 2011.
Qualitative data were entered into NVivo 8 for management
and coding. Open coding and content analysis were used for
progressive categorization of themes addressing descriptions of
the delivery systems’ context and changes that occurred during
the period of implementation of the voucher scheme according
to the perception of the stakeholders interviewed.
Additional timeline history workshops were held in Ghana
and Tanzania in July and December 2011, respectively, and
focused on the construction of timelines of events associated
with the ITN voucher schemes and with ITN programming in
general. Information on the phases of development and
implementation of the ITN voucher scheme in each country
was collated separately by different authors, and then jointly
synthesized around the building blocks of the health system.
Contextual factors were analysed in relation to the building
blocks of the health system, which are governance, human
resources, financing, informatics, technologies and service
delivery (WHO 2008), and broadly the same approach was
taken within the business sector. The building blocks of the
health system and the importance of addressing each of these
for health systems strengthening are incorporated into the field
of policy implementation in the concept of ‘systems thinking’.
This concept recognizes the need for stakeholders to manage
the ‘fit’ between the intervention and the system into which it
is being introduced, recognizing that each, the intervention and
the system/s, are changed during this process (de Savigny and
Adam 2009).
The information presented in a narrative review involves the
perceptions of authors of the included documentation and
interviewees and the interpretation of these by the authors of
the review. There are therefore limitations to this method
which requires a reflexive approach to interpretation of the
findings, as presented in the discussion.
Results
The key events in the comparative histories of the two national
ITN voucher programmes are provided in Table 1, which frames
the major milestones and phases in the conception, design,
piloting and implementation of the respective voucher pro-
grammes in Ghana and Tanzania.
We describe the stewardship, stakeholders, financing, dur-
ation and relevant contexts associated with each of the main
phases of concept, piloting, design and implementation
illustrated in Table 1 in each country.
Results for Tanzania
Conception phase
The idea for a voucher-targeted subsidy linked to ANC and/or
EPI was raised during a participatory brainstorming in a
meeting of over 40 mainly local country-based stakeholders
convened and facilitated by the Tanzanian Ministry of Health in
February 1996. The goal of the meeting was specifically to
brainstorm on how the Ministry could take advantage of the
high cost-effectiveness of ITNs for mortality reduction for
children under five. The meeting was chaired by the Chief
Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health who stated that
the Ministry could not afford to provide free nets and
challenged the stakeholders to come up with ideas.
Stakeholders included the local malaria research community,
the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Population Services International
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Table 1 Comparative key events and phases relevant to ITN voucher implementation
Notes: LSHTM: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, MOH: Ministry of Health, MoHSW: Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare, NID: National Immunization Day, RCC: Rolling Continuation Channel, TOR: Terms of Reference, USD: United States
Dollar.
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(PSI), academia, donors and the NMCP. The research commu-
nity (Ifakara Health Institute and the Swiss Tropical and Public
Health Institute) then developed the concept of a voucher into
a large-scale pilot project for two districts.
Pilot phase
The large-scale pilot testing of social-marketing with a voucher
for pregnant women was first implemented in Kilombero and
Ulanga Districts by the Ifakara Health Institute and the Swiss
Tropical and Public Health Institute for 2 years between May
1997 and June 1999, with funding from the Swiss Agency for
Development Cooperation (SDC) (Armstrong Schellenberg et al.
2001; Mushi et al. 2003; Tami et al. 2006; Marchant et al. 2010).
Results showed that the vouchers substantially increased ITN
coverage and were used appropriately by the population. A
number of operational and strategic lessons were learned that
informed the eventual design of the Tanzania National Voucher
Scheme (TNVS). The pilot project contributed to local capacity
development, local leadership and local ownership through six
PhDs for Tanzanian scientists who provided a cadre of expertise
that later contributed to the design, implementation and
evaluation of the TNVS.
Design phase
The design phase for a national ITN programme was long,
running from November 1999 to October 2004 and was widely
participatory. In November 1999 the NMCP Manager invited all
interested stakeholders to a meeting in Dar es Salaam and
announced the intention to develop a nationwide strategy to
deliver ITNs. Over 40 stakeholders including ITN manufacturers
attended the first meeting and pledged support. The main
delivery models operating at the time were private sector sales
through informal retail arrangements and through a
multi-district social marketing programme (SMITN) that
promoted branded nets and provided subsidized insecticide in
home treatment kits funded by United Kingdom’s Department
for International Development (DFID) and the Royal
Netherlands Embassy. This social marketing delivery continued
throughout the TNVS design phase.
In 2000 a major meeting of 60 stakeholders was convened
by the NMCP, supported by DFID, PSI and the Tanzania
Ministry of Health Essential Health Interventions Program
(TEHIP). Stakeholders evenly represented the multi- and
bilateral donor partners, NGOs, academia, researchers and the
private sector. A consultative group was constituted represent-
ing these five constituencies, which in turn commissioned
PriceWaterhouseCoopers to work with them to develop a
strategic approach. This was presented back to a larger
gathering of 90 stakeholders in August 2000 (Pricewaterhouse
Coopers et al. 2000). This strategy outlined an approach to move
from consumer subsidies for a single socially marketed ITN
brand towards generic promotion of all local brands of ITNs,
while also incentivizing the ITN manufacturers to extend
distribution chains to remote rural areas. At the same time,
the strategy called for the development of a national approach
to a high value ANC voucher based on the Kilombero Net
Project (KINET) experience to assist remote populations to
access these ITNs at low cost. This concept was developed into a
national strategy in November 2000 but was beyond the scope
of local donors to cover its costs (Ministry of Health 2000). In
January 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (GFATM) issued its first call for Round 1 proposals.
The TNVS proposal was then quickly adapted to the require-
ments of the GFATM by the NMCP and its partners and
submitted. It became the first project funded by the GFATM in
April 2002.
The consultative group was then reconstituted as a National
Steering Committee, again chaired by the Chief Medical Officer.
This group still provides representation to all stakeholder
groups and it meets quarterly to oversee the strategic issues
of the NATNETS to this day.
Once GFATM funding was received, the Swiss Tropical and
Public Health Institute with support from the SDC recruited a
professional team to run an ITN Cell embedded within the
NMCP. This ITN Cell managed the ITN grants on behalf of the
Tanzanian Government and co-ordinated all activities and
stakeholders in the country. The key components of the TNVS
programme were implemented and managed by four key
sub-contractors working hand-in-hand with the government
health care system. In the early phases of the TNVS the ITN
Cell assisted the procurement and tender boards of the Ministry
of Finance and the Ministry of Health to tender major
components of the programme such as the voucher logistics
(Mennonite Economic Development Associates), training and
behaviour change communications activities (Care, World
Vision, PSI) and research evaluation (Ifakara Health Institute
and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine).
The TNVS was subsequently launched officially in October
2004 and by December 2005 scale up nationwide was complete.
Between 2004 and 2010, ITN ownership in Tanzania almost
tripled from 22.6% to 63.8% due to the cumulative and
combined effects of vouchers and mass distribution (National
Bureau of Statistics [Tanzania] and ORC Macro 2005; National
Bureau of Statistics [Tanzania] and ORC Macro 2011).
Implementation phase
The implementation phase of the TNVS commenced in October
2004 and continues until the present (summer 2012). It repre-
sents a public–private partnership in which the private sector
manufacturers undertake to distribute ITNs, and now LLINs,
through their wholesale retail distribution chains, and to honour
the collection and exchange of TNVS vouchers for ITNs. The NGO
sector manages demand creation and behaviour change pro-
grammes as well as the distribution and redemption of vouchers
and database management/accountability. The public sector
handles the interface with the recipients and ensures that
vouchers are provided to all qualifying clients attending ANC and
EPI clinics. The research community provides evaluation. The
NMCP, with its ITN Cell, and the Ministry of Health National
Insecticide Treated Nets Program (NATNETS) Steering
Committee provide oversight and co-ordinate stakeholders
(http://www.natnets.org/). Over the years, new donors and
partners have joined the GFATM and SDC, principally Irish
AID, the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the
President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) (Hanson et al. 2008;
Hanson et al. 2009). Continuous evaluation has lead to pro-
gramme changes and increased efficiencies, and innovations
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such as the piloting of electronic vouchers and mobile phone
redemption mechanisms. The National Steering Committee has
ensured the co-ordination with the other ITN distribution
strategies, chiefly the catch-up mass distribution efforts
(Koenker et al. 2011). See Box 1 for details of the implementation.
Relevant contexts
Specific contexts in Tanzania independent of, but relevant to,
the TNVS include: (1) 6 years of prior experience with national
social marketing, building trust with the private sector and
developing a culture of ITN understanding and use; (2) a
vibrant local private sector ITN manufacturing base (up to four
domestic manufacturers), supported and promoted by govern-
ment assistance; (3) a strong tradition in malaria control
research and utilization of local research findings; (4) common
health policies and strategies across all districts despite
socio-economic disparities, avoiding prolonged piloting; (5) a
donor partner group that was willing to align behind a single
national ITN strategy, even if they did not always totally agree.
Results for Ghana
Conception phase
The concept of delivering ITNs through a voucher scheme in
Ghana was first suggested to the Ministry of Health and Ghana
Health Service’s NMCP by DFID consultants and by USAID in
2003. The concept was then presented to and supported by the
national ITN Partnership/Task Force. The Partnership/Task Force
was initially built around partners involved in a national social
marketing project implemented by the Ghana Social Marketing
Foundation and then extended to include other partners with an
interest in delivery of ITNs. It included the Ministry of Health,
WHO, International Network for Demographic Surveillance of
Populations and their Health (INDEPTH) Network, local and
international NGOs and health partners [BASICS, Program for
Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH), UNICEF, USAID,
DFID], local funding partners and the commercial sector. Local
manufacturers were not engaged.
Both DFID and USAID supported the development of the
voucher scheme concept into a programme designed for
implementation initially in one region with comprehensive
monitoring and evaluation. The objectives of the voucher
scheme were to: (1) improve access to ITNs for pregnant
women; (2) develop a sustainable system for delivering targeted
subsidies; (3) strengthen the private sector for ITNs through
market priming; and (4) enhance health staff capacity. The ITN
Partnership agreed that the voucher scheme would be part of a
segmented strategy to scale up ITNs based upon the differing
economic and health related context of the country’s central
and southern regions.
Design phase
The voucher scheme was designed by NetMark, a USAID-
funded project implemented by the Academy for Educational
Development, in a comparatively brief period in 2003 and a
draft design document was circulated to partners (Box 2).
Consensus of key partners was achieved for the overall national
approach to ITN delivery with the plan that the voucher scheme
piloted in Volta and Eastern Regions would be scaled up to
include seven southern and central regions (Brong Ahafo,
Western, Central, Ashanti, Greater Accra, Eastern and Volta) of
the ten regions in Ghana. In the economically disadvantaged
north, community-based action in partnership with public and
civil society (based upon the UNICEF Accelerating Child
Survival and Development model) would be scaled up across
Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions (Ghana Health
Service 2003). Five year planning (2004 to 2008) for funding for
this scale-up was approached on a region by region basis. The
one year of DFID funding for Volta and Eastern Regions
subsequently transitioned to GFATM funding, as did that of the
UNICEF project in Northern and Upper East Regions at the
beginning of 2005. The voucher scheme in Greater Accra and
Ashanti Regions was supported for 6 months during 2004 by
Exxon Mobil, and in Brong Ahafo and Western Regions for 6
months during 2005. All regions planned to have GFATM
funding for their respective strategies, voucher scheme or
UNICEF model operational by mid-2007.
Pilot phase
In April 2004 piloting began in Volta Region. This region was
selected due to its ecological representativeness of the northern,
central and southern belts of the country. However, there were
Box 1 The Tanzania National ITN Voucher Scheme (TNVS): how it works
The TNVS distributes vouchers to pregnant women and mothers of infants attending Reproductive and Child Health (RCH)
clinics and vaccination days. Vouchers can be redeemed for reduced price nets at participating retailers. In 2004 the TNVS
started providing vouchers to pregnant women; infant vouchers were added in 2009. Top-ups initially ranged from about TZS
700 to over TZS 1500 depending on the size of the selected net. In late 2006 the voucher value was increased to Tanzanian
Shilling (TZS) 3250 and the infant voucher was introduced. By 2008, the average top-up had reached over TZS 2300 (slightly
over US$ $2.00), exceeding the ability to pay of many mothers. In 2009 an upgraded voucher was introduced that fixed the
top-up at TZS 500. The small and fixed top-up meant that acquiring a LLIN became widely affordable again for mothers.
However, this also meant that an agreement had to be made by the net seller about a single type and size of net, de facto
eliminating consumer choice. In addition, procurement rules governing the TNVS funding meant that a single supplier had
to be selected and the others largely went out of business. At current levels, the TNVS distributes about 1.5–1.6 million LLINs
per year. The network of participating retailers in 2011 was quantified at 5426 retailers. A total of 4428 out of a possible 4891
rural public health clinics participate, including some private clinics. The current model estimates that vouchers reach 90% of
the beneficiaries attending clinics and that 80% of vouchers are redeemed (Njau et al. 2009a; Njau et al. 2009b; Marchant
et al. 2010; Koenker et al. 2011).
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doubts as to its being representative in terms of the local tradition
of using locally made nets in the southern area of the region.
Eight months after the confirmation of Volta Region as the initial
pilot region, the decision was made to expand the pilot to include
Eastern Region. This was also due to the availability of funding to
expand beyond one region, with Eastern Region selected due to
logistical ease as it borders Volta Region.
During the pilot phase, the voucher scheme was led by the
Volta and Eastern Regional Health Directorates. The NetMark
project, contracted by USAID, provided all the logistics,
conducted training together with regional staff, and worked
to support and develop the private sector involvement in the
scheme. DFID provided support in terms of seed funding for the
voucher subsidy and contracted the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine to provide technical advice for the
monitoring and evaluation of the scheme. The regional health
teams in both regions led the implementation of the monitoring
and evaluation activities. A management agent, EXP Momen-
tum, was contracted by USAID to manage the vouchers, which
involved supplying vouchers to health facilities, redeeming
vouchers with the distributors and monitoring of voucher
supplies and redemptions. Management agent fieldworkers
went to all health facilities employing at least one midwife to
deliver vouchers.
All ITNs were imported by international manufacturers since
there were no local manufacturers. The voucher scheme design
required the wholesale retailers to stock ITNs, exchange the
ITNs for the voucher plus top-up, and then replace the ITNs
with more stock in exchange for the voucher. In recognition
that the distributors and outlets did not have the financial
capacity to lay out funds for this stock, NetMark provided stock
advances to the distributors, who were then expected to pass
the stock on to the retailers. A requirement of the stock
advance was that the distributors would put up a quantity of
the stock themselves equal to the advance that they were given.
During the pilot phase, DFID provided extra seed funding
which did not require matching stock by the distributors, with
the aim of increasing geographic coverage of the voucher
scheme. The extra funding was based upon the premise that it
is only when the partners have sufficient stock that they can
‘sacrifice’ and take stock to areas where it will stay in the
system for longer. When they do not have adequate stock, they
opt for where they sell the fastest.
During pilot implementation, changes occurred to the original
design of the voucher scheme. Based upon the interviews with
stakeholders in both regions and at the national level, changes
in the voucher scheme from its original design occurred at four
points (Figure 1). The first change was precipitated by the
receipt of funding for ITNs from the GFATM by the NMCP,
who sought assistance from an international ITN manufacturer
to import the ITNs. This international ITN manufacturer
established a warehouse in Accra (the capital city) to supply
their market in both Ghana and other countries of West Africa,
and to reduce lead times on supply of nets into these countries.
A similar and linked change in the system of the public sector
delivery of ITNs was again facilitated by increased funding and
the recognition by the NMCP of the difficulties faced by the
regions and districts in transporting mosquito nets from the
central medical stores (CMS). A distributor was contracted to
deliver mosquito nets from the CMS to the regions. The
distributor who won the contract was also a distributor of ITNs
for the international ITN manufacturer through the formal
commercial sector, including within the voucher scheme.
During the voucher scheme, distributors established a new
delivery point for ITNs, which was a structure under the
management of the distributors. This took the form of one
salesperson sitting under a branded ‘umbrella’ redeeming
vouchers but also selling nets commercially, immediately
outside health facilities. Vouchers plus the top-up charge were
exchanged for ITNs at these sales points.
Distributors took ITNs to midwives for them to sell, including
redemption of vouchers, and possibly at full commercial price.
These distributors were amongst those who were distributing
ITNs to the formal commercial sector for the voucher scheme.
The introduction of a 6-month voucher scheme in Greater
Accra and Ashanti Regions, the commercial hubs of the
country, was met by larger demand than anticipated.
Insufficient supply of ITNs in the country to meet the
demand resulted in the withdrawal of ITNs from the Volta
Region outlets to meet the higher demand in Greater Accra and
Ashanti Regions. The withdrawal of ITNs from retail sector
outlets in Volta Region precipitated complaints from the health
facilities involved in the voucher scheme that there were no
ITNs available in the retail sector and therefore the voucher
scheme could not function. Due to pressure from facilities on
District Health Management Teams (DHMTs), and from
DHMTs on the Regional Health Directorate (RHD), the RHD
asked for the assistance of the NMCP in the form of public
sector nets to send to the health facilities. The result was the
supply of ITNs to health facilities that were part of the voucher
scheme and a loss of trust by the public sector in the private
sector’s commitment to the voucher scheme.
During the pilot evaluation period there was a significant
increase in the proportion of households owning a mosquito net
Box 2 The Ghana ITN Voucher Scheme: how it worked
The concept and design were such that discount vouchers were given to pregnant women during their first presentation at
an ANC clinic. The voucher entitles the recipient to a discount of approximately USD $4.20 on the purchase of an ITN
available through retail outlets. The recipient or their representative takes the voucher to a participating retail outlet, stocking
approved ITNs and provide the top-up cash required, together with the voucher, for an ITN. The retailer removed a
‘proof-of-purchase’ sticker from the ITN packaging as it was sold and attached the sticker to the voucher. The retailer
exchanged the voucher for more stock from his/her distributor, and kept the top-up value of cash from the client. The
distributor exchanged the voucher with its proof-of-purchase sticker attached, for cash from the management agent.
Vouchers presented to the management agent without a proof-of-purchase sticker were rejected.
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in Eastern Region but not in Volta Region. However, in Eastern
Region the increase was not attributable to the voucher scheme
but was due to increased delivery of ITNs through ANC
(Webster et al. 2010b)
Implementation phase
Scale-up of the various voucher schemes in Ghana did not aim to
achieve national scale but aimed to include the seven southern
regions of the country. After the completion of the pilot in Volta
and Eastern Regions, DFID funding was withdrawn as planned
and continuation was funded through GFATM. The scheme was
scaled up in 2006 to Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions through
GFATM funding. The voucher scheme in Central Region began in
2008, just before the end of the scheme in Volta and Eastern
Regions. Household ownership of ITNs rose from 2.5% and 0.7%
in 2003, to 33.3% and 29.2% in 2008, in Volta and Eastern
Regions, respectively (Ghana Statistical Service Noguchi
Memorial Institute for Medical Research ORC Macro 2004;
Ghana Statistical Service Ghana Health Service and ICF Macro
2009). Given the context of multiple complex delivery strategies
in play, these increases in household ownership of ITNs cannot
be directly attributed to the voucher scheme.
Relevant contexts
The length of time during which the private sector have been
delivering mosquito nets in Ghana is unknown. However, unlike
Tanzania, there was no manufacturing of nets in country. Before
the large-scale introduction of ITNs, Ghana had a thriving
market, to different extents in different parts of the country,
with local nets delivered through the second-hand clothing
market. It is clear that there is a long tradition of use of nets
(Agyepong 1992; Agyepong and Manderson 1999) but these nets
differed, and were delivered through different supply systems,
from ITNs. Nets are delivered through the formal retail sector
where the outlets are a variety of types of shops, and through the
informal retail sector where the outlets are mainly local market
stalls and itinerant vendors within these markets. Immediately
prior to development of the voucher scheme in Ghana there was
a public–private partnership for the sustainable marketing of
insecticide-treated materials which began in 1998 and finished
in 2002. The objectives of the three-year Ghana Social Marketing
Foundation project were the creation of increased demand for
nets, increased demand for net (re)treatment, and increased
availability of nets and insecticides for net treatment through
making them more affordable. Social marketing was imple-
mented across all 10 regions of the country.
Ghana’s first ITN policy, formulated in February 2002, was
built around a ‘twin track approach’ for distribution, broadly
involving targeting of subsidies to vulnerable groups through the
public sector, and promotion of widespread availability and
distribution of ITNs through the private sector. During 2002,
three forms of delivery within the public sector were operating:
the ACSD ‘intervention package’ sponsored by UNICEF, ITNs
provided by the NMCP to districts for delivery through routine
health facilities, and a one-off delivery integrated with a measles
campaign (Grabowsky et al. 2005a; Grabowsky et al. 2007) These
systems had different delivery points, costs to the end-user, and
scale of implementation. Alongside these systems some DHMTs
were proactive in managing the ad hoc delivery of nets/ITNs
through health facilities within their districts. In Upper East and
Northern Regions some districts have been beneficiaries of both
the ACSD and NMCP ITNs. The differing pricing policies caused
some confusion. The policy on cost to the recipient for ACSD ITNs
was US$0.56 for pregnant women and children under five, and
US$2.22 to the rest of the population, whereas the NMCP ITNs
were US$2.22 to pregnant women and children under 5 years.
During 2003, funding from the GFATM facilitated another
round of ITN distribution by the NMCP to the districts, which
was extended to include distributions to community-based
NGOs. The 20 districts targeted for this distribution were
different to the 20 targeted for the NMCP distribution in 2002.
In October 2004, encouraged by the success of the integrated






































Figure 1 Diversity of mosquito net delivery systems during implementation of the ITN voucher scheme in Volta and Eastern Regions.
Notes: CBO: Community Based Organization, LCS: Licensed Chemical Seller, RHMT: Regional Health Management Team.
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NMCP embarked upon a distribution integrated with polio
immunizations in Central Region. During this integrated
delivery, discount coupons were given along with polio
immunizations to children under five. In Ghana the use of a
paper subsidy delivered in the public sector for redemption in
the private sector was called a voucher, whereas those delivered
in the public sector for exchange for an ITN in the public sector
were called coupons. The coupons were then exchanged
together with a top-up value of US$2.22 for an ITN.
Discussion
Tanzania and Ghana have much in common as a basis for
scaling-up malaria prevention interventions. They have similar
orders of magnitude in Gross National Product per capita
[$1350 and $1530 purchasing power parity (ppp), respectively]
and total health expenditures ($28 and $57 ppp, respectively)
(WHO 2011). Both countries have received to date similar
cumulative per capita support from the GFATM for malaria
control ($7.56 and $6.44, respectively). Both countries have a
policy (as opposed to service delivery) oriented Ministry of
Health using separate agencies for service delivery (local
government authorities in Tanzania and the Ghana Health
Service in Ghana). Both Ministries have strong National
Malaria Control Programmes with stable and long-term
experienced NMCP Managers. Both countries have wide geo-
graphic disparities in socio-economic status. In both countries,
donors aligned behind the direction on the government in
designating the ITN voucher scheme as appropriate for all
regions (Tanzania) or specific regions (Ghana) based upon
economic indicators. Both countries have strong health research
institutions with traditions in ITN research. Both countries
started preparing the ground with the private sector through
social marketing of ITNs as early as 1998. Both have a strong
wholesale retail tradition in private sector distribution of nets.
Both countries have the same bilateral and multilateral donors
supporting malaria control. Both countries had consultative
multi-stakeholder committees advising on ITN programming.
Nevertheless, the introduction of a new and complex health
intervention requiring significant adjustments in the health
system and the private sector business system followed very
different trajectories. Our case review of the integration of
voucher schemes and the ultimate sustainability of this
integration focused on both health system contexts as well as
external contexts in the two countries. We identified a number
of contrasts between the two experiences. We discuss these
under the following headings: (1) objectives and scale; (2)
alternative delivery systems; (3) the nature and response of the
private sector; and (4) health system stewardship and govern-
ance for alignment of partners.
Objectives and scale
The sense of what could and what should be achieved by the
voucher scheme differed in the two countries. The voucher
scheme in Tanzania had an objective of increasing coverage of
ITNs in all regions and districts of the country irrespective of
socio-economic disparities. In Ghana the objective was to scale
up to seven of the ten regions only, due to differences in the
economic context of the northern and southern regions of the
country. The three northern regions were to be covered by a
non-voucher strategy involving direct delivery of ITNs through
the public sector and community, which did not involve the
private sector. These differing objectives may have been a
reflection of the differing levels of confidence in the private
sector delivery channels in the two countries to reach
disadvantaged populations. But they added substantial com-
plexity to programme management. There are similar
socio-economic disparities in Tanzania with the most disad-
vantaged being in the south. However, the final phase of the
national social marketing programme (SMARTNET) that pre-
ceded the TNVS was aimed at pulling the private sector
distributors into disadvantaged areas to strengthen the voucher
scheme there.
Alternative delivery systems
Social marketing of ITNs was the first major delivery strategy
for ITNs in both countries and began around the same time,
1997 (Tanzania) and 1998 (Ghana). In Tanzania in 2002 the
social marketing project entered a second phase and changed
its strategy from promotion of a public sector social market
brand, to generic promotion of all private sector brands to
prepare the private sector for the advent of a national voucher
scheme. In Ghana, funding for social marketing simply finished
at the end of the first phase and the project closed. During that
same year, three different ITN delivery strategies were imple-
mented in Ghana. These new strategies did not involve the
private sector, and could in fact be seen as directly competitive.
In selected districts of regions of the country, ITNs were directly
delivered through health facilities, mainly through ANC, and
constituted a directly competing strategy to the voucher scheme
during the pilot. In Tanzania, PSI have been a major player in
the delivery of ITNs for several years with adaptation in
strategies based on directions from within Tanzania, whereas in
Ghana the input of local and international NGOs was less
constant, with the Ghana Social Marketing Foundation leading
the social marketing for 3 to 4 years and NetMark taking a very
different approach within the voucher scheme.
The nature and response of the private sector
Both Tanzania and Ghana have many polyester textile mills, all
of which are capable of making nets for ITN purposes.
However, only in Tanzania did these mills convert some of
their textile production into nets. This was in response to direct
appeals and the opportunity provided by the initial social
marketing that directly engaged the local manufacturers and
primed the market for them. Concerted stakeholder manage-
ment consistently included the manufacturers in all meetings
and official launches, and addressed their concerns, particularly
around achieving tax and tariff exemptions. This public sector
stakeholder engagement in Tanzania thus contributed to a
thriving, competitive private sector for ITNs, with eventually
four factories and distribution networks by 2009. Of the four
ITN manufacturers, two have since ceased production (TMTL
and MOTEX), one continues producing unbundled polyester
nets (SUNFLAG), while one local ITN producer (A-Z Textiles),
who converted early to innovative LLIN production of poly-
ethylene nets, now dominates the domestic market since public
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subsidies are now restricted to LLINs. International LLIN
producers have not yet been able to penetrate this market in
Tanzania. Conversely, in Ghana, existing textile mills were not
engaged and did not enter production. There was only one
major agricultural distributor who also distributed ITNs.
However, there was a thriving informal private sector in locally
sewn mosquito nets in some areas of the country. This informal
market in Ghana was not a recognized industry and involved
relatively small-scale informal networks of suppliers to local
markets. This was very different to the formal business sector
manufacturers and distributors involved in Tanzania.
The result was that in Tanzania, the voucher scheme worked
with the established system of ITN supply in the country, whilst
in Ghana this was ignored, with the aim of building a new
system of supply within the country. In Ghana it was hoped
that the voucher scheme would promote the private sector in
ITNs, and in fact this was an objective of the scheme. In
Tanzania the flourishing private sector meant that the voucher
scheme was an appropriate strategy to adopt, rather than
subsidized delivery through the public sector which would
compete. The relatively poorly developed ITN private sector in
Ghana contributed significantly to problems that arose during
the pilot. The distributors involved in the voucher scheme and
in the formal private sector had limited resources and therefore
limited capacity to buy ITNs in bulk. With the long lead times
for importing nets into the country, the market was not able to
respond sufficiently quickly to the increased demand generated
by the short-term voucher scheme in Greater Accra. As a result
ITNs were withdrawn from Volta Region outlets. This in turn
precipitated a loss in trust by the public sector and the
distribution of ITNs to health facilities, where midwives then
had the option of offering a voucher or an ITN to pregnant
women. These are classic stock and flow issues that systems
thinking can foreshadow and mitigate.
Stewardship and governance
Genesis of the idea for the voucher scheme was indigenous in
Tanzania and arose out of a challenge laid out by the Ministry
of Health to its malaria control community. Consequently the
idea was locally owned. In contrast, the idea for the voucher
scheme in Ghana was to a large extent imported and based
upon what was happening in Tanzania, and driven more by
external partners. The general feeling within Ghana that the
private sector had an important role to play in the delivery of
health care, as reflected through their initial support to social
marketing, meant that the voucher scheme was an attractive
concept.
Whilst recognizing the overwhelming contextual differences
between the two countries in the nature, development and
strength of the private sector, the time devoted to engagement
and consensus building among stakeholders was also a critical
factor. The design of the voucher scheme in Tanzania spanned
years and deliberately took time to engage a maximum range
and number of stakeholders representing all interests, including
manufacturers. Senior Ministry of Health officials took leader-
ship and ownership from the beginning and throughout the
entire period, chairing a multi-stakeholder steering committee.
They also made structural change in the NMCP putting in place
and securing sustained funding for a dedicated ITN Cell to
manage the TNVS. In Ghana, the design phase spanned only
months and was conducted largely by one partner, NetMark, a
USAID contractor. It was felt by some that the design paid
insufficient attention to the context of mosquito net delivery
through the informal commercial sector in Ghana. These
differences indicate greater cohesion and alignment of partner
action in support of a single co-ordinated strategy at service
delivery level in Tanzania. In Tanzania there was a belief that the
ITN voucher scheme should and could work and that, given the
basis of the strong private sector in terms of factories and
priming through social marketing, this was the appropriate
strategy. In Ghana, the voucher scheme was one amongst
several ITN delivery strategies that was being tested.
In Tanzania, donor partners aligned behind a single delivery
strategy for the whole country, initially for social marketing and
later for the transition to the TNVS. In Ghana, there were an
increasing number of parallel delivery systems in play which
were defined by regions and their partners, some of which
undermined the voucher implementation. In Ghana, regions
were, in essence, assigned to or adopted by different funding
partners. This resulted in a far more complex and fragmented
scene for both the public and the private sectors in Ghana
compared with Tanzania.
The pilot phase was conducted by researchers in Tanzania
prior to engaging stakeholders in designing the national system.
It formed an important evidence base and motivation for the
public and private sector stakeholders. In Ghana, the pilot
phase occurred after the design phase and was executed by a
variety of implementers. The agents of donor partners played a
leading role, working mainly with the Regional Health Directors
rather than the central Ghana Health Service or NMCP officials.
The public sector played a relatively small role.
The implementation phase in Ghana became a series of
extended pilots in various parts of the country with frequent
design changes. Several of these pilots were confounded by the
continuance of other delivery models that confused providers,
clients and the private sector, and eroded the effectiveness of
the voucher intervention. Partners were funding different
interventions in different regions of the country rather than
working toward a common set of strategies for all regions.
Although these institutional partners were the same as those in
Tanzania, they acted sub-nationally in Ghana, while in
Tanzania they were aligned to support a common national
approach to all regions.
In Tanzania, social marketing was a single strategy which
allowed, over time, the development of strengthened trust and
understanding between the public sector and the private
manufacturers, and it primed the market. This led to an easy
transition for the manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers to
respond quickly to the voucher implementation. In Ghana we
could find no evidence that the social marketing period had
built this sort of relationship. The private sector reacted in a
much more fragmented and unpredictable way. Again the
strong stewardship and governance of the TNVS as a single
strategy led to a relatively simple business model for the private
sector in Tanzania. In Ghana the pluralistic approach of
multiple simultaneous delivery models was mirrored in an
equally complex business system in the private sector retailing
of ITNs. The result was unmanageable complexity.
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All information included in this review involves a level of
subjectivity of those involved, from the documentation available
for the ITN voucher schemes in Tanzania and Ghana through to
the in-depth interviews and stakeholder reconstruction of
timelines of events. All should therefore be considered as
based upon the perceptions of those involved. Bias in inter-
pretation cannot be excluded. All authors have some involve-
ment in the voucher schemes in one of the countries; none
were involved in both countries. Each therefore sees the events
through their own experiential lens and this could have
influenced their interpretation of the data. However, because
of the varying roles of the authors from national programme
managers to implementers and evaluators across the two
countries, the events and interpretations presented here are
representative of a wide group of stakeholders.
Conclusions
From a systems thinking view point this case illustrates an
example where internal system structures and stakeholders (e.g.
the ITN Cell) drove system change in Tanzania in ways that
determined the eventual behaviour of the system. In Ghana,
external ideas, events and actors were more prominent in driving
events, and subsequent system change and adoption of the
innovation did not occur. Despite many similar contextual
factors which provided an enabling environment for the voucher
scheme in Tanzania, these did not do so in Ghana. The
fragmentary approach taken by stakeholders added complexity
and led to multiple concurrent delivery systems that were
difficult to manage, and indeed ran into conflict with each other.
The private sector context for manufacturing was under
developed, not promoted, and remained under developed and
unavailable to the system. Hence the voucher scheme was never
seen as an appropriate national strategy. From a systems
thinking perspective on the design of interventions, this case
study also illustrates the critical importance of starting with and
sustaining broad and long-term stakeholder management and
alignment with visible national ownership and stewardship. This
proved valuable for managing and reducing complexity of the
system in Tanzania, and for strategically implementing and
adjusting complex health interventions that provoke and require
health system changes over time on a system-wide basis.
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